

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, RI

JOINT VISION 2010: NAVAL WARFARE IMPERATIVES

By

Jaime Navarro  
CDR USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Jaime Navarro

19 May 1997

Paper directed by  
George W. Jackson, Captain, USN  
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

John D. Roberts, Captain, USN  
Faculty Advisor



19970814 120

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

## RREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol:  C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): Joint Vision 2010: Naval Warfare Imperatives (UNCLAS)			
9. Personal Authors: Jaime Navarro, CDR/USN			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 19 May 1997	
12. Page Count: 30			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: strategy; warfare; naval; presence; joint; sealift; sea control; sea-basing; sealift; maneuver; information superiority.			
<p><b>Abstract:</b> This paper is an analysis of <i>Joint Vision 2010</i> (JV 2010), the recently published guidance for future joint warfare, and its implications on <i>...From The Sea and Forward...From The Sea</i>, the current naval strategic concept papers. The analysis will identify naval warfare imperatives relevant and integral to the success of JV 2010. JV 2010 was unveiled by General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the summer of 1996. JV 2010 provides a conceptual template that guides the development of our nation's Armed Forces in meeting the challenges of 2010 and beyond. In V 2010, the Chairman recognizes that highly trained joint forces, enabled by advances in technology, are essential to future warfare. <i>...From The Sea and Forward...From The Sea</i>, which preceded the Chairman's vision, also recognize the utility of integrated joint forces in future warfare. Naval orces have, however, oriented their focus on contributing to joint warfare by influencing events in and around the littorals and if necessary, by projecting combat power from the sea. In general, JV 2010 and the naval strategic concepts share a similar theme of dominating future adversaries across the full spectrum of military operations.</p> <p>Naval warfare imperatives, as defined in this paper, are those elements of future warfare implied by JV 2010 that are either unique to the naval service or need emphasis to equal the importance articulated in the vision. The imperatives identified in the paper are naval forward presence, sea control, sea basing, strategic sealift and joint education and training (emphasis needed). These elements are key to achieving the immediate, precise and decisive application of joint combat power articulated in JV 2010.</p>			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified  X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

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## Abstract

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Naval warfare imperatives, as defined in this paper, are those elements of future warfare implied by JV 2010 that are either unique to the naval service or need emphasis to equal the importance articulated in the vision. The imperatives identified in the paper are naval forward presence, sea control, sea basing, strategic sealift and joint education and training (emphasis needed). These elements are key to achieving the immediate, precise and decisive application of joint combat power articulated in JV 2010.

## Preface

The author acknowledges that there is a disparity in scope between *Joint Vision 2010* and ...*From The Sea and Forward...From The Sea*. JV 2010 focuses only on future joint warfighting. The naval strategic concepts, however, have a broader perspective in that there is additional emphasis in the role naval forces provide in peacetime engagement, deterrence and crisis control in support of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. This paper will therefore only examine naval warfare imperatives that contribute directly to future joint warfare as envisioned by the Chairman.

Additionally, the author assumes, in order to bound the scope of the paper, that the armed forces' acquisition mechanism will continue to pursue integrated systems to reduce redundancy and ensure interoperability of future military systems. This is a JV 2010 imperative as well as an imperative for all services. This requirement has its roots in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Any future naval capabilities, as presented in this paper, are used only to expound on a particular concept and are not necessarily a promotion of the particular capability.

## **I. Introduction to Joint Vision 2010**

General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unveiled *Joint Vision 2010* (JV 2010) in the summer of 1996. In the introduction he states:

Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting<sup>1</sup>.

In JV 2010, the Chairman recognizes that high quality people and highly trained joint forces are crucial to future warfare. He recognizes that military forces must capitalize on America's leadership in technology and leverage that technology across all aspects of warfare (intelligence, command and control, weapons, etc.). The Chairman acknowledges "the unqualified importance of information will not change in 2010"<sup>2</sup> and he places a significant priority in gaining information superiority. Information superiority is "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."<sup>3</sup> JV 2010 emphatically promotes jointness. The "template" provides the services a common direction but allows for "developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and program."<sup>4</sup> Together, common doctrine, integrated systems and joint training will yield a synergistic effect that will dominate an adversary across the spectrum of military operations. This vision of "full spectrum dominance" is enabled by information superiority and achieved through four new operational concepts:

Dominant maneuver. Dominant maneuver will be the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to

position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish the assigned operational tasks.<sup>5</sup>

Precision engagement. Precision engagement will consist of a system of systems that enables our forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when required.<sup>6</sup>

Full-dimensional protection. Full-dimensional protection means having control of the battlespace to ensure our force can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels.<sup>7</sup>

Focused logistics. Focused logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational and tactical level of operations.<sup>8</sup>

JV 2010 is not a new military strategy and it is not entirely dedicated to future warfighting concepts. JV 2010 does frame the context in which the Chairman envisions the employment of joint forces in future military operations. It identifies certain “threads of continuity” that will be relevant in the geopolitical environment of 2010. JV 2010 recognizes continuity in the general direction of our nation’s goal through the 2010 time frame. From the National Security Strategy (NSS), it recognizes the longevity of our fundamental interests which lie in enhancing U.S. security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy abroad.<sup>9</sup> From our current National Military Strategy (NMS), it reiterates that the primary task of the armed forces is to promote stability and thwart aggression through deterrence but stands ready to fight and win, should deterrence fail.<sup>10</sup>

The Chairman anticipates a wider range of threats in the uncertain future as the globalization of the world increases and our nation's interests abroad widen. New adversaries will use unconventional and asymmetrical warfare that will be enhanced with varying levels of technology. JV 2010 recognizes the need to prepare joint forces to operate at the low and high end of military operations.

JV 2010 establishes criteria for an implementation plan that is integral to the vision and is currently under development. Unified Commanders in Charge (CINC), Services and joint organizations are uniting their efforts to develop the new concepts into organizational and procedural changes, as well as identifying requisite capabilities to realize JV 2010.<sup>11</sup> With its foundation of quality people, competently trained and technologically equipped, the Chairman views American joint forces of 2010 as the benchmark for militaries worldwide.

## **II. Naval Service Strategic Direction**

The U.S. Naval Service has historically adapted to the needs of the nation. One significant change in its orientation is reflected in the early 1800's when the service moved away from a coastal defense force toward a "great fleet." This was initially in response to the security needs of our expanding maritime commerce. However, through the writings and influence of Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the nation sought and attained a Navy which elevated this nation's status to a great naval power. Said status was



necessary to pursuing our political agenda. Two world wars and a cold-war have forced the naval service to evolve in both numbers and capability. It has remained a naval power which, in turn, has structured itself to meet the specific challenges of the global threats. We can reflect on a Navy that adapted well to previous global challenges with its successes now a part of the naval history. Today, a significant change in the security environment has necessitated another reorientation of our naval service. Additionally, the future environment, as framed by the NSS and the NMS, offers new challenges of an uncertain world of international interdependence.<sup>12</sup> This sets today's military focus on several regional challenges instead of a single global threat, and necessitates a naval force that can effectively respond to a variety of challenges in support of our national interest.

...*From the Sea* (FTS) was the naval service response to the dramatic change in the geopolitical environment. Issued in September of 1992, the white paper announced a "landmark shift in operational focus and a reordering of coordinating priorities"<sup>13</sup> within the naval service. Although maintaining the same national level purpose of supporting this nation's political interest, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its naval threat provided the opportunity to change how naval forces were to operate in the future. The change reflected in FTS emphasizes "power projection" from the sea as well as "employment of naval forces to influence events in the littoral regions of the world" in support of our national objectives.<sup>14</sup> In FTS, naval leadership recognized the gap between the strategic culture of a blue water fleet and the new security environment proved to be too wide to bridge with simple adjustments in force levels and composition

alone.<sup>15</sup> The new direction dictated by FTS provides the nation “naval expeditionary forces, shaped for joint operations, operating forward from the sea and tailored for national needs.”<sup>16</sup>

The main thrust of FTS is conducting operations in the littorals. The littorals are simply defined as the coastlines of the earth. Gone was the global threat (at least in the foreseeable future) and the likelihood of blue water engagements. FTS anticipates future warfare in the littorals and recognizes the complexity of this operating environment. It therefore directs organizational changes, acquisition of supporting capabilities, and new doctrine to ensure success in littoral operations. FTS basis its future success on developing four operational capabilities in support of the new strategic concept: command, control and surveillance; battlespace dominance; power projection; force sustainment. Emphasis is also given to operations in a joint and combined setting.<sup>17</sup>

FTS was further refined in 1994 with the publication of *Forward...From the Sea* (FFTS). This new document maintained the focus articulated by its predecessor but it additionally emphasized the contributions naval services provide during peacetime operations, in responding to crises and regional conflicts. It specifically emphasizes the value of being “engaged in forward areas with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crisis”<sup>18</sup> and, if necessary, transition rapidly to combat operations. FFTS recognized five enduring roles for naval forces needed to meet the challenges of a

dynamic and highly uncertain future: power projection from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift and forward presence.<sup>19</sup>

### **III. Naval Warfare Imperatives**

JV 2010 is underpinned by high quality people, jointness and technology. This foundation is key to attaining information superiority and achieving the four operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics. In the analysis of JV 2010 and the naval strategic concepts, it is apparent that the warfighting concepts in FTS and FFTS, both of which were written and promulgated prior to new vision, closely parallel the operational concepts proposed by JV 2010. However, the naval strategic concepts have a broader perspective and emphasize the a larger role for naval forces in peacetime engagement, deterrence and crisis control in support of the NSS and NMS. This paper will identify only those aspects of the naval warfare that contribute directly to future joint warfare as envisioned by the Chairman. Notwithstanding, it will be necessary to recognize several aspects of peacetime engagement that correlate directly with effectiveness of future combat.

Naval warfare imperatives, as defined in this paper, are those elements of future warfare implied by JV 2010 that are either unique to the naval service or need greater emphasis to equal the importance articulated in JV 2010. The imperatives identified in

the paper are naval forward presence, sea control, sea basing, strategic-operational-tactical sealift and joint education and training (emphasis needed).

Naval forward presence.

JV 2010 recognizes that “power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force.”<sup>20</sup> It also acknowledges the trend is toward reduced overseas land forces. These two points alone present a strong argument for the increased significance of forward deployed naval forces in future joint warfare.

Forward presence is recognized by FFTS as one of the five fundamental and enduring roles for the naval forces. Forward presence is the maintenance of forward deployed or stationed forces to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, deter adversaries and enhance the ability to respond quickly to contingency operations.<sup>21</sup> These forces are tailored to anticipate regional threats and support national needs. Unique to naval forces is their “expeditionary” character. Expeditionary “implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly.”<sup>22</sup> In this regard, forward deployed naval forces offer three enduring missions which contribute directly to the success of future warfare as envisaged in JV 2010. These are building coalition interoperability, gaining information superiority, and

providing the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with immediate and decisive on-scene combat power.

*Building coalition interoperability.* JV 2010 anticipates future warfare will require U. S. forces to operate in concert with allies and coalitions. This should be no surprise since the majority of the conflicts in which this nation has participated have historically been in the form of an ad hoc coalition.<sup>23</sup> However, JV 2010's emphasis on technology requires that we find "the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition partners."<sup>24</sup> Forward deployed naval forces are ideally suited for this task. Forward deployed naval forces are postured to conduct exercises and assorted training activities with allies and friends. They develop and integrate foreign forces, whose capabilities vary significantly, at the appropriate level in preparation for future combat. Differences in critical combat issues such as command and control, level of employment, logistic support, rules of engagement and interoperability are resolved or at least understood prior to conflict through in-depth training. As the technological advances projected by JV 2010 evolve and the tempo of operations increases, it will be even more crucial to engage future coalition partners and work through the command and control and interoperability problems inherent to the disparity in technology.

*Gaining information superiority.* The Chairman identifies information superiority as an essential element of future warfare. Information superiority enables the new

warfighting concepts of JV 2010 and provides the battlespace awareness needed by the commander to operate successfully in a rapidly changing environment. Forward deployed naval forces will be a critical link to achieving information superiority and battlespace dominance in future warfare. In peacetime, naval forces employ a wide assortment of organic sensors that complement national sensors and feed into the overarching information architecture.<sup>25</sup> In the future, the depth and range of these organic systems will grow and provide real time or near-real time information to the commander. This peacetime capability will allow the commander to be cognizant of the battlespace well before hostilities. Similarly forward deployed naval forces gain information superiority by day to day operations in areas of future conflict. Spoken in layman's terms, naval forces have the advantage of operating in a future adversary's "home court." This practice of operating forward yields appreciable and unique knowledge of the operating environment--sea, air and land--and will be crucial for employment of follow-on joint forces. In peacetime and combat, naval forces contributions to information superiority will serve to enable dominant maneuver and precision engagement. They will be the catalyst to achieving a high level of battlespace awareness especially in the early stages of conflict.

*On-scene combat credible forces.* Dominant maneuver and precision engagement recognize speed, tempo, massing effects and economy of force as essential elements of future warfare. JV 2010 seeks "a more rapid transition from deployment to full operational combat."<sup>26</sup> FTS and FFTS support these schemes through their expeditionary

character and credible combat power. On-scene naval forces provide the commanders with many options. They are a “potent and cost-effective alternative to power projection forces from the continental United States and are well suited for the many contingencies that can be deterred or quickly handled by forward-deployed force.”<sup>27</sup> Forward deployed naval forces assure initiative, surprise and an offensive spirit at the outbreak of conflict. The myriad of decisive and lethal (and non-lethal) options available to the commander cover the low and high ends of combat. At the low end, naval forces may be sufficient to accomplish the tasks assigned if a retaliatory or blockade mission is required. At the high end, naval forces can blunt an attack, fix a land force or disrupt the adversaries timeline through raids and interdiction missions while heavier joint forces deploy into the area of operations. Naval forces in this situation will provide on-scene and rapid operational linkages for transitioning to conflict--a key aspect of JV 2010. Additionally, after conflict, naval forces remain on station to continue to provide the commander with the same military options should they become necessary. The flexibility and agility are enduring characteristics of forward deployed naval forces and will remain relevant to the high tempo operational concepts of JV 2010.

#### Sea control.

Sea control is but one mission of the naval service, however, it enables many others. “Sea control is the condition that exists when one has freedom of action to use an area of the sea for one’s own purpose for a period of time, and if necessary, deny its use

to the enemy. It includes the airspace, water and seabed.”<sup>28</sup> Sea control, mainly the freedom of action it provides, is critical to naval operations since it allows naval forces the operational and tactical maneuver needed to accomplish their mission.

JV 2010 demands “more agile, faster moving joint operations” which will outpace and overwhelm the enemy across the spectrum of warfare.<sup>29</sup> This translates to attaining freedom of action for joint forces in and around the battlespace to achieve dominant maneuver and precision engagement. This same freedom of action also enhances full dominant protection through mobility and dispersal. Freedom of action for high tempo operations can be provided by naval forces at sea and on land through sea control. The current naval approach for future operations as stated in FTS and the Marine Corps’ Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) is founded on freedom of action. Future naval warfare will optimize the medium of the sea for tactical and operational maneuver at sea and from the sea. Naval forces will use their freedom of action to “disorient, divert, and disrupt the enemy”<sup>30</sup> and lead or enable dominant maneuver of joint forces. The depth of naval forces’ capabilities, from bullets to precision munitions, will provide the joint force commander with a wide range of options for precision engagement operations from the sanctuary of the sea. This includes precision from small unit concepts of OMFTS through mobility, both ship-to-objective and shore-to-ship maneuver.<sup>31</sup> In a major operation or campaign, naval forces can “seize and defend advance bases-port and airfields-to enable the flow of land-based air and ground forces.”<sup>32</sup> Naval forces offer the necessary capabilities for the high tempo operations of



JV 2010, however, the fundamental freedom to operate in this fashion emanates from the basic and enduring task of sea control.

FTS had previously recognized the complexity of the littorals. It clearly cautions that “mastery of the littorals should not be assumed.”<sup>33</sup> JV 2010 adds the familiar concerns that exist today regarding access and force protection. Sea control, and the freedom of action it provides, must be available to our forces projecting power from the U.S. continent. Naval services must vigorously pursue doctrine, systems and tactics necessary to gain sea control. Rapidly advancing technology and weapons proliferation, especially in sea denial capabilities, will challenge our naval forces by providing potential adversaries a wide spectrum of capable and lethal threats. Sophisticated and modern diesel and nuclear submarines, assorted multi-spectrum mines and low-observable cruise missiles will be the preferred anti-Navy weapon for many nations. The effects of these type of capabilities is evident in the analysis of the battle for the Falkland Islands. Submarines and cruise missile threats dominated the British commander’s thoughts.<sup>34</sup> It becomes apparent, and a naval warfare imperative, that naval forces must attain the requisite level of sea control, continuous or temporal, with speed and confidence to keep pace with the operational demands of a 2010 joint force.

#### Sea basing.

Sea basing is clearly unique to naval forces, but more importantly, it is the fundamental concept by which we employ naval forces. It is a concept that continues to grow within the naval service, yet it requires better joint understanding in order to harness the tremendous value of sea basing joint capabilities. The strength of sea basing lies in giving the future joint commander the ability to execute operations at sea and from the sea and provide for sustained operations ashore. There are two fundamental characteristics unique to the concept of sea basing that are critical to future joint warfare. First, sea based assets offer on scene U.S. sovereignty. It removes the concern of access from the equation and provides the joint force commander with the freedom to execute at will using the full array of sea based systems available to him. The second characteristic of sea basing is the increased survivability it provides joint forces due in part to reducing their vulnerability. By operating from the sanctuary of the sea, dispersed and in a constant state of motion, sea based assets retain tremendous ambiguity in their operations. Coupled with their small footprint, these assets make it less difficult for future adversaries to target relative to forces ashore. In the case of submarines, for example, their inherent stealth exudes survivability. This argument does not suggest sea basing all joint forces; however, it suggests sea basing those key capabilities critical to realizing JV 2010 battle space dominance and operational concepts.

Together, both sea basing characteristics offers a joint force a robustness in capabilities and endurance throughout a joint operation or campaign. Sea basing future joint capabilities may include but are not limited to C2 (command and control systems),

C4ISR sensors and systems (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), joint fires, and theater missile defense. Of note, strategic deterrence systems and logistics are two joint sea based capabilities that are enduring and relevant to JV 2010. Future sea based systems would be dispersed but integrated with national and other services' systems to bring synergism to the battlespace. Initially, sea based capabilities may be the only systems available to the joint commander. If that is the case, he will have an array of joint systems available to him with which he is intimately familiar. These joint systems will allow him to execute operations immediately, gaining and maintaining the initiative and controlling tempo. An example of an initiative that captures this idea is Navy's Combined Engagement Capability (CEC). CEC is a sea based capability that could establish a baseline defensive sphere at sea, and then move to project that sphere over land. As additional land based capabilities arrived, the sphere would grow as the new systems integrated with the baseline systems. The depth of sea based systems will provide the joint force commander with the operational reach to engage strategic, operational and tactical target sets. If needed, the commander can easily transition to a shore facility without losing his battlespace awareness. While ashore, sea based capabilities would continue to serve as primary assets, or serve to compliment joint force capabilities ashore. Sea basing captures JV 2010's efforts in achieving battlespace dominance by making available those joint capabilities needed to gain information superiority and empower the four new operational concepts of JV 2010.

Strategic-operational-tactical sealift.

JV 2010 acknowledges strategic sealift as an imperative for future warfare through their concept of focused logistics. FFTS had previously recognized it as an enduring mission for naval forces. JV 2010 states that “the trend for American joint forces [in future conflict] will be to project power from the continent to the theater of operations.”<sup>35</sup> This approach to power projection will continue to place a significant burden on sealift. In our most recent conflict, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 95% of warfighting equipment arrived via sealift. Under the concept of focused logistics, that number will be reduced to 60%.<sup>36</sup> Although less of a requirement, 60% is still significant. Naval services recognize the need and are committed to the acquisition of requisite number of strategic lift vessels.

Beyond the strategic requirement, focused logistics also demands a “responsive, flexible, and precise” capability to achieve the high tempo operations of dominant maneuver.<sup>37</sup> This entails elevating the characteristics of naval forces--self-sustainment, mobility and sea basing--to a joint capacity. It also means a continued effort to lessening naval organic logistics through precision weapons, commonality in supplies, and smaller units operations. Some of these ideas are already captured in OMFTS. Navy can lead in pursuing new delivery concepts from pre-positioned ships and other sea based logistics assets that translate the notions of “tailored logistic packages” and “total asset visibility” into effective sustainment in battle-operational and tactical level.<sup>38</sup> Together, strategic

sealift and new supporting operational and tactical logistic concepts from the sea will optimize future joint operations envisioned by JV 2010.

### Joint Education and Training.

Joint warfare or jointness is the cornerstone of JV 2010. The Chairman views jointness as an imperative in his vision. Today jointness seeks to synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special operations to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns or major operations.<sup>39</sup> In JV 2010, the definition is germane but the level of integration will be much higher. In the words of the Chairman, “to achieve this integration [level] while conducting military operations we must be fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically.”<sup>40</sup> In this statement the Chairman reasserts his strong belief and commitment to joint training and education.<sup>41</sup> In this regard, naval warfighters must eventually evolve into joint warfighters.

Not surprising, both FTS and FFTS embrace jointness. Gone is the “lone wolf” image of Maritime Strategy which defined the Navy’s primary role as “fighting the open-ocean battle while all other services would be engaged in the continental war.”<sup>42</sup> Naval services’ focus in the littorals strongly infers joint operations. However, JV 2010 summons such a high emphasis on jointness that it demands a competing dedication by

the naval services. For naval services, joint education and training can be targeted in two areas: individual joint education and joint training for naval units.

*Joint education.* Joint education for the naval officer is essential in understanding the intricacies of joint warfare. As stated in JV 2010, “the evolution of command structures, increase pace and scope of operations, and the continuing refinement of force structure and organizations will require leaders with the knowledge of the capabilities of all four services. Without sacrificing their basic service competencies, these future leaders must be schooled in joint operations from the beginning of their careers.”<sup>43</sup> This is a requirement that is not easily met in the typical career path of today’s naval officer. The need requires institutionalization by the naval services to ensure baseline and mid-grade joint education. The baseline may be provided as part of the academic curriculum prior to commissioning (e.g., academies or ROTC programs). The education would of course be broad in scope, but it would serve as a clear service commitment to the importance of joint warfare, even for the junior officer. Mid-grade joint education such as Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is currently a hit or miss in the careers of most officers. In today’s operation environment, joint education competes with an officer’s inherent priority to stay operationally competitive, and therefore promotable. This needs resolution. The importance of joint education in JV 2010 demands a system that accommodates these concerns and develops naval officers into effective joint warfighters.

*Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)/Amphibious Ready Group(ARG)/Unit joint training.* Joint education is only the beginning. Naval officers trained in joint doctrine bring to their respective units a broad understanding of the joint arena and in-depth knowledge of other services' capabilities. This broader knowledge, however, needs to be translated and integrated with naval warfare doctrine to attain the synergism of future joint warfare. In articulating the environment, JV 2010 states "even for higher level commanders, the accelerated operational tempo and greater integration requirements will likely create a more stressful, faster moving decision environment. Real-time information will likely drive parallel, not sequential, planning and real-time, not-prearranged, decision making."<sup>44</sup> The message is clear, naval forces--single units to CVBG/ARG--need "high quality, realistic, and stressful training ...emphasizing integration of joint capabilities ...enhanced [by] modeling and simulation of the battlespace."<sup>45</sup> U.S. CINC Atlantic Command (USCINACOM) has the lead and responsibility for training joint forces. Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) and United Endeavor exercises are but the beginning.<sup>46</sup> Naval services must acknowledge the requirement and assist in structuring joint training to ensure a balance of naval and joint warfare. In the future operating environment depicted by JV 2010, forward deployed naval forces will be integral to large scale joint operations. They must understand, "more than the other military services...how other services operate, what they need to be effective in meeting their warfare tasks and assignments, and what their warfighting concepts are."<sup>47</sup>

#### IV. Conclusion

JV 2010 introduces four new operation concepts—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics—that are underpinned by a new level of jointness and technological advances. These concepts challenge the services to identify and develop their unique warfighting attributes to enable joint forces to achieve full spectrum dominance. ...*From The Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea* guide naval services in a direction that clearly parallels JV 2010 and offer the foundation for achieving full spectrum dominance. Naval forces' greatest contributions to JV 2010 is captured in the enduring character that advantages on scene operations at sea and from the sea. Their contributions originate from forward naval presence operations which will be critical to shaping the battlespace for future joint forces. Their knowledge of joint warfare will provide joint force leadership at the outset and provide a robust role throughout a joint campaign. The freedom of action gained from sea control, the myriad of options from joint sea based capabilities and force sustainment--strategic, operational and tactical--are imperatives which optimize the operational concepts of JV 2010.



## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Vision: 2010 (Washington: 1996), 1.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>9</sup>A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington DC: The White House, February 1996), i.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: 1995), i.

<sup>11</sup>Joint Vision 2010, 32.

<sup>12</sup>Joseph C. Strasser, "The Role of Naval Forces in Combat," in Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy. ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, MA: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 251.

<sup>13</sup>U.S. Department of the Navy, Forward...From the Sea (Washington: November 1994), i.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>Jan S. Breemer, "The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of American Naval Power," Strategy Review, Spring 1994, 41.

<sup>16</sup>U.S. Department of the Navy, ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Washington: September 1992), 2.

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- <sup>17</sup>Ibid., 7.
- <sup>18</sup>Forward...From the Sea, 1.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid., 10.
- <sup>20</sup>Joint Vision 2010, 4.
- <sup>21</sup>U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (Washington: March 1994), 73.
- <sup>22</sup>Forward...From the Sea, 8.
- <sup>23</sup>Terry J. Pudas, "Preparing Future Coalition Commanders," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1993-94, 40.
- <sup>24</sup>Joint Vision 2010, 9.
- <sup>25</sup>U.S. Department of the Navy, Forward...From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (Washington: March 1997), 5.
- <sup>26</sup>Joint Vision 2010, 14.
- <sup>27</sup>Forward...From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept, 2.
- <sup>28</sup>The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (London: HMSO, 1995), 235.
- <sup>29</sup>Joint Vision 2010, 20.
- <sup>30</sup>Forward...From the Sea, 7.
- <sup>31</sup>U.S. Headquarters Marine Corps, Operational Maneuver from the Sea (Washington: 1994), 4.
- <sup>32</sup>Forward...From the Sea, 7.
- <sup>33</sup>...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, 5.
- <sup>34</sup>Admiral Woodward recalls an Argentine submarine threat that never evolved as a serious threat. However, the threat still caused great concern to his forces as described in several episodes of over reactions to possible submarine sightings. Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 96-97, 142, 164.

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<sup>35</sup>Joint Vision 2010, 4.

<sup>36</sup>J.J. Cusick, "Joint Vision 2010: Focus Logistics," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: March 1997.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington: 1994), ix.

<sup>40</sup>Joint Vision 2010, 9.

<sup>41</sup>General Shalikashvili has, during his tenure as the Chairman, voiced his dissatisfaction with the status of Joint Training. These two articles, "General Shalikashvili sees gap in joint force operations," National Defense, October 1994, 16, and Barbara Starr, "JCOS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) Chairman Urges Better Joint Training" Jane's Defence Weekly: September 9, 1995, 6, capture his thoughts on the issue.

<sup>42</sup>Breemer, 45.

<sup>43</sup>Joint Vision 2010, 29.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>46</sup>Goodman, Glenn W., Jr., "Real Missions, Real Training, Real Jointness: Atlantic Command makes strides in its joint training exercises," Armed Forces Journal International, October 1995, 16; "Stress the Staffs, not the Troops—JTASC (Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center)," Sea Power, February 1996, 33.

<sup>47</sup>William A. Owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1994, 34.

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